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Court has sanctioned only the privilege to
discuss public officials. Because many of
the reasons advanced for making privileged
remarks about public officials apply
equally well to debates over public mat-
ters, the scope of the privilege appears
to be predestined to expansion. Besides
defamation, the impact of the Times de-
OBSCENITY-A RE-EVALUATION
"The line dividing the salacious or
pornographic from literature or science
is not straight and unwavering."' In an
effort to install uniformity and stability in
the area of obscenity, various states have
enacted statutes to protect public morals
by discouraging the dissemination of ob-
scene materials. The federal govern-
nent, pursuant to its power to establish
post offices and post roads, 3 has also
enacted obscenity legislation.4
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957)
(concurring opinion).
2 State v. Schrup, 229 Iowa 909, 295 N.W. 427
(1940).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Roth v. United
States, supra note 1, at 480.
4 The statute is presently contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1964). The pertinent provisions are as
follows:
"Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy
or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance;
and. . ..
Every written or printed card, letter, circular,
book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any
kind giving information, directly or indirectly,
where, or how, or from whom, or by what
means any of such mentioned matters . .
be obtained. . ..
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cision may be seen in the right of privacy
area.
The future course of Times will be
plotted by the Supreme Court, which is
faced with the problem of balancing
society's right to know with the indivi-
dual's right to protect his reputation.
Even in the context of the state and
federal statutes, obscenity remains a vague
and unexplained term. Consequently,
cases have attempted to articulate stand-
ards to enable other courts to deal
effectively with obscenity. In Regina v.
Hicklin5 the Court of the Queens Bench
declared that, in passing on the obscenity
of an item, it was necessary to judge it by
the effect of an isolated passage upon
peculiarly susceptible persons. Thereafter,
in United States v. Kennerly,G Judge
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from
any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the
mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of any-
thing declared by this section to be nonmailable
• . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first such offense .. "
5 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360. The court found that half
of the book in question was clearly obscene and
condemned the whole book, notwithstanding the
fact that the author had good motives in writing
and circulating the book. He sought to expose
errors and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church and not to distribute the work to preju-
dice good morals. Id. at 371.
6 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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Learned Hand opposed the Hicklin test
since its standard for obscenity was de-
pendent upon the sensibilities of the most
susceptible persons. He proposed that
obscenity be determined by the "average
conscience." In United States v. One
Book Entitled Ulysses By James Joyce,
the court declared that the proper way
to evaluate a book is to consider the
"dominant effect" of the material.'
In 1957, considering whether or not
obscenity was a constitutionally protected
category of speech, Mr. Justice Brennan
in Roth v. United States 9 expounded a
new and more definite standard for de-
termining obscenity. The test was "whether
to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals 'to prurient interest." 10
The Court there rejected the Hicklin test
since it might well declare obscene
material which treats sex legitimately, and
restrict free speech in violation of first and
fourteenth amendment guarantees."
Roth became the definitive statement of
the law of obscenity. Its holding was
particularly useful in that it laid down
specific guidelines for determining what
was obscene and hence outside the con-
stitutional free speech provisions. First,
the material must be judged as a whole,
not by any isolated parts. Second, it
must be judged by its impact on the aver-
age person, not weak or susceptible in-
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
I d. at 708.
9 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
'Old. at 489.
11 Ibid.
dividuals. 12
The Roth standard has been qualified
so that material which appeals to the
prurient interest must also be found to be
patently offensive. 1  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in both Roth and Jacobel-
lis v. Ohio," indicated that obscenity is
excluded from first and fourteenth amend-
ment protection only where it is "utterly
without redeeming social importance." 15
Finally, the American Law Institute
developed a test for obscenity in its Model
Penal Code. The Code declares: "A thing
is obscene if, considered as a whole, its
predominant appeal is to prurient in-
terest." 1" This test refers to the capacity
of the material to attract individuals eager
for a forbidden look. It excludes from
the definition of prurient interest mere
tendencies in the material to arouse lustful
thoughts and desires or to corrupt or de-
base. 17 On the other hand, the Roth
definition of prurient interest is not a
single test, but encompasses several defini-
tions of obscenity and is much broader
than the test set forth by the Model Penal
Code. It includes the tendency to arouse
lustful thoughts or desires, the tendency
to corrupt and deprave, and the Model
Penal Code definition of obscenity. 8
12 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 53 (1960).
13 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
486-87 (1962).
14378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
"1Ibid.; Roth v. United States, supra note 1,
at 484.
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957).
17 Ibid.
1s Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship:
The Core Constitutional Issue-What Is Ob-
scene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289, 292 (1961).
Since Roth, there has been a discern-
ible trend in the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court toward clarification
of the standard there enunciated. 9 On
March 21, 1966, the United States
Supreme Court handed down three de-
cisions which cumulatively have the effect
ot substantially modifying the position of
the Court on exactly what materials are
obscene. It is the purpose of this paper
to consider the impact of these decisions
on the law of obscenity.
A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs Of A Woman Of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts 20 (hereinafter cited as A
Book "of Pleasure") arose when Fanny
Hill was banned in Massachusetts. The
Supreme Court held that censorship of
this book was unconstitutional. Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan, speaking for the majority,
said that three elements must coalesce be-
fore material can be considered obscene.
First, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole must appeal to the
prurient interest of average persons apply-
ing contemporary community standards.
Second, the material must be found
patently offensive in that it affronts con-
temporary community standards relating
to matters of sex. Third, the material
must be utterly without redeeming social
importance. The majority then found
that the book was constitutionally immune
from censorship since it could not be held
to be utterly without redeeming social
value.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, said that
the Court had appended a new test to that
-' See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 12, at
5-48.
20383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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of Roth. He maintained that the qual-
ification that the material be utterly with-
out redeeming social importance narrowed
the Roth standard and unwarrantedly
extended first and fourteenth amendment
protection of free speech and press. Mr.
Justice Clark believed that redeeming
social importance should not be made a
test separate and distinct from the prurient
interest test. He concluded that the
book should be declared obscene since it
was being commercially exploited for the
sake of its prurient appeal.2 1
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented and ad-
vocated a "hardcore pornography" 22 test
to determine obscenity. Mr. Justice White
also dissented, arguing that the utterly
without redeeming social importance ele-
ment was a restriction on the ability to
censor the obscene. In his opinion, porno-
graphic material containing elements of
obscenity should not be declared obscene
if it has any social importance. He felt
21 Also known as the "pandering" test which will
be discussed in the Ginzburg case.
2: Lockhart and McClure stated that, in fact,
Justices Brennan and Clark also have a hardcore
pornography concept of obscenity. Lockhart &
McClure, supra note 12, at 60. Pornography
has been defined as "daydream material, divorced
from reality, whose main function is to nourish
erotic fantasies of the sexually immature, ...
or to nourish auto-eroticism. This concept of
pornography provides a reasonably satisfactory
and workable tool for distinguishing porno-
graphic material from the non-pornographic."
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 18, at 297.
Mr. Justice Harlan said that hardcore pornog-
raphy is the only type of material that should
be suppressed. He said hardcore pornography
"does describe something that most judges and
others will 'know ...when [they] see it' and
that leaves the smallest room for disagreement
between those of varying tastes." A Book "of
Pleasure," 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
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that the social importance element should
be a part of the prurient interest test and
not distinct from it.
The decision in A Book "of Pleasure"
has resulted in a further refinement of the
standard set forth in Roth v. United States.
In determining whether or not material is
obscene, courts must now analyze the sub-
ject matter to determine if all three of the
aforementioned elements are present, i.e.,
prurient interest, 23 patent offensiveness, 24
and lack of social importance.2 5 Whether
the subject matter satisfies these tests is
determined by looking at the material
alone and not the setting in which the
material is disseminated. Where any one
element is missing, the material is initially
protected by the guarantees of the first and
fourteenth amendment freedoms. This
protection may be lost, however, where
the material involved falls within the pur-
view of the "pandering" test, to be dis-
cussed later.
In Mishkin v. New York,"' a new
standard was developed in addition to
those enunciated by A Book "of Pleasure."
It concerned fifty paperbound books which
sold for several thousand per cent above
cost. The themes recurrent throughout
these books included masochism, sadism,
lesbianism, fetishism, homosexuality and
heterosexuality. The United States Su-
preme Court held the New York obscenity
statute valid since it banned only hard-
core pornography which was not consti-
tutionally protected under the test in Roth.
The Court stated:
23 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
24 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, supra note
13.
25 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
2.383 U.S. 502 (1966).
The First Amendment prohibits criminal
prosecution of the publication and dis-
semination of allegedly obscene books
that do not satisfy the Roth definition of
obscenity. States are free to adopt other
definitions of "obscenity" only to the ex-
tent that those adopted stay within the
bounds set by the constitutional criteria of
the Roth definition, which restrict the
regulation of the publication and sale of
the books to that traditionally and univer-
sally tolerated in our society. 27
The Court found that the design of the
material and its dissemination was aimed
exclusively at a clearly defined deviant
group, nevertheless, the material still satis-
fied the Roth test since the dominant
theme appealed to the prurient interest of
this deviant group. Proof of this prurient
appeal was found from many factors, in-
cluding the appellant's own evaluation of
the publications. Mr. Justice Brennan
writing for the majority in Ginzburg v.
United States 28 said: "As in Mishkin v.
New York . . . we view the publications
against a background of commercial ex-
ploitation of erotica solely for the sake of
their prurient appeal." 29
Mr. Justice Black dissented in Mishkin
taking his familiar position "that this
Court is without constitutional power to
censor speech or press regardless of
the particular subject discussed." 10 Mr.
Justice Stewart also dissented upon the
ground that the books did not constitute
hardcore pornography, and were thus pro-
27 Id. at 507-08.
2S Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
29 id. at 466.
0 Mishkin v. New York, supra note 26, at 516
(dissenting opinion).
tected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.31
The case is noteworthy since the Court
examined the appellant's commercial ex-
ploitation in finding prurient appeal to a
deviant group. Evidence of price rela-
tive to the books' cost, the themes of the
books and the author's own evaluation
and handling of them were all relevant
factors in this determination. The Court
also considered the setting in which the
publications were created and the audience
to which they were directed. This case,
therefore, found obscenity by looking at
the commercial setting of the publications.
Ginzburg v. United States 32 elaborated
upon and crystallized the commercial
setting consideration used in Mishkin
to determine obscenity. In Ginzburg,
petitioner was convicted of violating
the Federal Obscenity-in-the-Mails Statute.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction despite the fact that the
publications might not be obscene in and
of themselves. They were held obscene
because the advertising solely emphasized
the sexually provocative aspects of the
publications in order to appeal to the
salaciously disposed, which is a form of
commercial exploitation of erotica known
as "pandering."
Ginzburg had published the magazine
Eros, the biweekly newsletter Liaison,
and The Housewife's Handbook on
Selective Promiscuity. Eros contained
photo-essays and articles concerning love,
sex and sexual relations which had ap-
peared in professional journals. It also
contained an interview with a psycho-
3. Id. at 498.
3 2 Supra note 28.
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therapist who favored broad license in
sexual relationships. The Housewife's
Handbook on Selective Promiscuity was
a sexual autobiography detailing the
author's sexual experiences. The Court
found that the materials had originated or
were sold "as stock in trade of the sordid
business of pandering-'the business of
purveying textual or graphic matter openly
advertised to appeal to the erotic interest
of their customers.' " 3
For example, Eros sought mailing
privileges from localities the names of
which obviously had erotic value in
soliciting the magazine. In addition, cir-
culars advertising Eros and Liaison
stressed sexual candor and said the "pub-
lishers would take full advantage of what
they regarded as an unrestricted license
allowed by law in the expression of sex
and sexual matters." 34 The Housewife's
Handbook on Selective Promiscuity which
contained material of informational and
therapeutic usefulness was indiscriminately
disseminated, not limited to physicians or
psychiatrists. The introduction to the
book emphasized sexual imagery. Con-
cerning each of the three publications,
advertisements stated: "Guaranty
Documentary Books, Inc. unconditionally
guarantees full refund on the price of
[Name of Publication] . . . if the book
fails to reach you because of U.S. Post
Office censorship interference." 35 This ad-
33 Id. at 467. Pandering was alluded to by Chief
Justice Warren in his concurring opinion in Roth.
He said Lhat the defendants were engaged in
"commercial exploitation" of materials with pru-
rient effect. Roth v. United States, supra note
23, at 496.
3 1Supra note 28, at 468.
35 Id. at 470.
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vertisement exemplifies the prurient appeal
of the publications. The Court said that
petitioner represented the publications in
a salacious manner, thus causing the
reader to accept them as prurient, and to
purchase them for "titillation" rather than
for intellectual value.
Where an exploitation of interests in
titillation by pornography is shown with
respect to material lending itself to such
exploitation through pervasive treatment
or description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination
that the material is obscene even though
in other contexts the material would
escape such condemnation .3
As a result of this case, defendant Ginz-
burg was sentenced to prison for five
years. In June, 1966 a petition for re-
hearing was denied by the Supreme
Court.37
There were four dissenting opinions in
Ginzburg. Mr. Justice Black dissented
claiming that petitioner was harshly sen-
tenced to five years imprisonment. He
said petitioner could not possibly have
known that his publications were obscene
since the standards were so vague and
meaningless. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented
on the ground that only hardcore porno-
graphy should be censored and that the
publications in question did not fit that
class. He said further: "The First
Amendment, in the obscenity area, no
longer fully protects material on its face
nonobscene, for such material must now
also be examined in the light of the de-
fendant's conduct, attitude, motives." 
36 d. at 475-76.
37Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
38 Ginzburg v. United States, id. at 494 (dis-
senting opinion).
Mr. Justice Harlan maintained that by
following the "pandering" test the Court
had written a new statute which makes
unlawful the mailer's intent to pander
questionable matter. 9  Mr. Justice
Stewart's dissent also argued that since
the material was not hardcore porno-
graphy, it was protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments. He asserted that
no statute makes "commercial exploita-
tion" or "pandering" or "titillation" a
criminal offense. Therefore, petitioner
was convicted of an offense with which he
was not originally charged, a violation of
due process requirements.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in both
Ginzburg and Mishkin in one opinion. He
said that a book should be obscene on its
own and not found obscene merely be-
cause of its suggestive advertising. He
believed that the books in question had
redeeming social value. Furthermore, in
his view, "the First Amendment allows
all issues to be expressed-whether or-
thodox, popular, off-beat or repulsive." 40
Two standards for determining ob-
scenity emerge from these three cases.
First, there is the already developed Roth
test which requires the presence of three
elements before material can be deemed
obscene: prurient appeal, patent offen-
siveness, and a total lack of redeeming
social importance. The second test is a
product of Ginzburg and Mishkin. The
Court not only views the material itself,
but looks at it in the context in which the
publication was presented. It looks into
the motives, attitudes and conduct of the
39 Ibid.
401d. at 491.
disseminator to determine if he is "pander-
ing," "titillating" or "commercially exploit-
ing" the material so as to appeal to the
prurient interest of the average person.
In other words, the publications are
viewed against the background of com-
mercial exploitation of erotica solely for
the sake of their prurient appeal. Thus,
applying this test, material not obscene
on its face, will be obscene when commer-
cially exploited for the sake of its prurient
appeal. The "pandering" test would
seem to be applicable only to borderline
cases where the three elements of the
qualified Roth test are not clearly present.
The resulting impact of Mishkin and
Ginzburg is an extension of the scope of
obscenity control and a narrowing of the
guarantees of the first and fourteenth
amendments. The "pandering" test is
significant in that it makes possible a more
pervasive exclusion of unorthodox and
unusual ideas from the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech and press. The
exact extent of the applicability of this
test is not yet certain. However, it is
apparent that the "pandering" test has
potentially extended the federal govern-
ment's control, as well as that of the states,
over obscene material.'
Positively, the Ginzburg case has in-
troduced the element of "pandering" as a
criterion for determining obscenity.4 2 But
the overall standard of obscenity is still
vague. Such broad terms as "pandering"
or "commercial exploitation," when over-
laid on language such as appeal to the
41 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 507-08
(1966).
4' Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 37, at
478.
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prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and
utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance do not appear to clarify the am-
biguity that existed when only the three
latter terms were employed. But it must
also be realized that the area of constitu-
tional law, and, more specifically, ob-
scenity, is in such a state of flux that it
would probably be impossible to provide
an explicit standard to guide public con-
duct. The guidelines set down and fol-
lowed by the Court are vague general
principles which can only be applied to
concrete cases as they arise.
The state of the law may now be
described as variable obscenity, ' the type
which changes with time, place and cir-
cumstance.
Under variable obscenity, material is
judged by its appeal to and effect upon
the audience to which the material is
primarily directed. In this view, material
is never inherently obscene; instead, its
obscenity varies with the circumstances of
its dissemination. Material may be ob-
scene when directed to one class of
persons but not when directed to
another. 44
Constant obscenity, on the other hand,
describes material which once ascertained
as obscene will always be obscene. Con-
stant obscenity "will limit the constitution-
ally obscene to hard-core pornography or
material very close to that line .... "4
Under this view, constant obscenity will
not consider obscene nonobscene material
which is pandered. Using the variable
obscenity concept, nonobscene material
4: See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Ob-
scenity: The Developing Constitutional Stand-
ards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 68-88 (1960).
44 Id. at 77.
45 Id. at 74.
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that is pandered will be declared ob-
scene.
4 6
Lockhart and McClure, acknowledged
authorities in the area, would probably
agree with the test set forth in Ginzburg,
for there are good reasons for including
the element of the intent of the purveyor
in determining whether a thing is obscene
or not. They stated that "obscenity should
be a variable concept, depending upon the
manner of marketing-the appeal in the
marketing-and the nature of the primary
audience to which the appeal is made. '47
What the Court has done is retreated
from its position that publications are con-
stitutionally protected where they have any
redeeming social value. The free competi-
tion of ideas fostered in a free society by
our constitutional protection of speech
and press is designed to promote progress
and moral well-being by exposing society
to diversified opinion. When ideas which
of themselves have an aspect of social
value, despite their unorthodox nature,
are disseminated to convince the general
public that the new way will be the better
one, the Constitution requires that they not
be interfered with. But, the Court has
apparently decided that when profit seek-
ers attempt to take advantage of constitu-
16 Id. at 77.
4. Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship:
The Core Constitutional Issue-What Is Ob-
scene?, 7 UTAH. L. REv. 289, 298 (1961).
tional protections through "titillation,"
then the Constitution permits the regula-
tion and prohibition of their activity.
The Court seems to have made a prac-
tical judgment that there is no constitu-
tional need to let these profit seekers take
advantage of the fringe areas of constitu-
tional protection. It has apparently been
concluded that the threat of danger to
society from their activities outweighs the
need of society for their information.
Since the Supreme Court makes a
de novo review of the facts in all ob-
scenity cases, 8 it places itself in the role
of the ultimate censor. But it must be
realized that this danger is minimized
since works having redeeming social im-
portance would not be kept from the
market place merely because they are
pandered. Only where borderline works
have slight redeeming social value will
pandering be enough to tilt the scales in
favor of censorship.
The decisions have resulted in increas-
ing the states' power to declare material
obscene. Future state legislation on ob-
scenity will probably be drafted along the
pandering line and it would seem likely
that it will be effective in excluding much
objectionable material presently available
in the market place.
• Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 25, at 187-90.
